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A STRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF
“EMPLOYMENT” IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY
E. Gary Spitko*
Abstract
The considerable growth of the platform economy has focused
attention on the issue of whether a provider engaged through a transaction
platform should be classified as an employee of the platform operator,
and therefore within the purview of workplace protective legislation or
as an independent contractor, thus outside the scope of such legislation’s
protections. This Article focuses specifically on whether the operator’s
reservation of the right to impose quality control standards on the
provider ought to give rise to employment obligations running in favor of
the provider and against the operator. This narrow issue is of great
importance to the future of the platform economy. Quality control
standards promote trust between platform consumer and provider,
enabling network effects leveraging, and benefitting the platform
operator, consumer, and provider. Yet, if the law considers the operator’s
right to impose quality control standards on the provider as a factor that
will weigh in favor of finding that the provider is an employee of the
operator, then the operator is more likely to forgo the right to impose such
standards.
With respect to much workplace protective legislation, neither the
statutory language nor the legislative history is even minimally helpful in
defining “employment.” Thus, this Article engages in a structuralpurposive inquiry into the definition of employment as applied to the
platform economy. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, this Article
explores the structure of workplace protective legislation generally and
identifies a “control bargain” implicit in that structure pursuant to which
the state imposes a scheme of workplace protective regulation on the firm
only if the firm retains a certain type and degree of control over its
worker. Second, this Article examines the nature of the platform economy
and the function of quality control standards within that economy. From
this examination, this Article concludes that the nature of the platform
economy suggests that the platform operator’s retention of the right to
impose quality control standards on providers should be seen as outside
the scope of the control bargain and, therefore, should not weigh in favor
of finding an employment relationship. Finally, this Article considers
case law addressing the meaning of employment in the similar context of
* Presidential Professor of Ethics and the Common Good and Professor of Law, Santa
Clara University. The author is grateful to Naomi Cahn, June Rose Carbone, Keith CunninghamParmeter, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Jeremias Prassl, and Michael Risch for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article and to Kerry L. Macintosh and Gary G. Neustadter for
responding to my research inquiries.
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the franchisor-franchisee relationship. This case law supports this
Article’s principal conclusion by demonstrating that the control bargain
allows for exceptions to the rule that the firm’s retention of control over
a worker weighs in favor of finding that the firm employs the worker, that
the firm’s reservation of the right to impose quality control standards can
be such an exception, and that such an exception can be discerned from
the nature of the relevant workplace structures.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers whether “platform economy” workers who are
engaged through transaction platforms should be classified as
“employees” of the platform operators within the purview of workplace
protective legislation or as “independent contractors” outside the scope
of such legislation’s protections.1 This Article uses the term “platform
economy” in a narrow sense to refer to business models that use
transaction platforms to bring together consumers and service providers
and thereby facilitate commercial transactions.2 More specifically, this
Article focuses on platform operators that meet the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s definition of a “digital matching firm.”3 These platform
operators facilitate peer-to-peer transactions using internet platforms
such as mobile apps; utilize a user-based rating system to evaluate
platform providers; afford platform providers flexibility in deciding their
working hours; and rely upon platform providers to supply their own
tools and assets necessary to provide the service at issue.4
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), for example, is a well-known
platform operator. Uber provides an “on-demand” transaction platform
that enables consumers who need a ride to find drivers who are willing to
supply a ride for a fee.5 Other well-known platform operators include
Handy (professional home cleaners and “handymen”),6 Instacart (grocery
delivery),7 Rover (dog boarding and dog walking),8 TaskRabbit
(freelance labor to help with chores),9 and Zeel (in-home massages).10
1. See, e.g., Trebor Scholz & Frank Pasquale, Serfing the Web: On-Demand Workers
Deserve a Seat at the Table, NATION (July 16, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/serfingthe-web-on-demand-workers-deserve-a-place-at-the-table/ (labeling the worker classification
issue “the most fundamental labor issue of the digital economy”).
2. See PETER C. EVANS & ANNABELLE GAWER, CTR. FOR GLOBAL ENTERPRISE, THE RISE
OF THE PLATFORM ENTERPRISE: A GLOBAL SURVEY 5, 9 (2016), http://thecge.net/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-Platform-Survey_01_12.pdf; Irving Wladawsky-Berger,
The Rise of the Platform Economy, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (Feb. 12, 2016, 3:26 PM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/12/the-rise-of-the-platform-economy.
3. RUDY TELLES, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE: ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., DIGITAL
MATCHING FIRMS: A NEW DEFINITION IN THE “SHARING ECONOMY,” 1, 2–4 (June 3, 2016),
https://www.esa.gov/sites/default/files/digital-matching-firms-new-definition-sharing-economyspace.pdf.
4. Id.
5. See UBER, https://www.uber.com/?exp=home_signup_form (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
6. See HANDY, https://www.handy.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
7. See INSTACART, https://www.instacart.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
8. See ROVER, https://www.rover.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
9. See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
10. See ZEEL, https://www.zeel.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). For an extensive list of
platform operators meeting the U.S. Department of Commerce’s definition of a “digital matching
firm,” see TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 23–25.
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In the platform economy, platform operators argue that they do not
supply the end products or services.11 Rather, they argue, platform users
who are providers supply end products or services to other platform users
who are consumers.12 Platform operators typically facilitate the provision
of these end products or services by furnishing software and an algorithm
to match the provider and consumer, and by making available an online
rating system to foster trust among the platform’s users.13 Uber itself, for
example, argues that it does not provide transportation.14 Indeed, Uber
owns no vehicles and steadfastly maintains that it does not employ any
drivers.15
Yet, frequently, the platform operator is no mere intermediary. In
many cases, the platform operator dictates critical terms of the
transaction, including details of the provider’s compensation and
provider’s services.16 Indeed, Professors Martin Kenney and John
Zysman have suggested that “we are in the midst of a reorganization of
our economy in which the platform owners are seemingly developing a
power that may be even more formidable than was that of the factory
owners in the early industrial revolution.”17

11. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 98 (2016).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 98–99.
14. UBER, U.S. TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/ (last visited Nov.
5, 2017).
15. O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Salovitz
v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-14-CV-823-LY, 2014 WL 5318031, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2014);
Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-10769-NMG, 2014 WL 1338148, at *6 (D.
Mass. Mar. 24, 2014).
16. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that
platform operator Lyft dictates to the drivers who use its platform the rates at which the drivers
are compensated); O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1142 (“Uber sets the fares it charges riders
unilaterally.”); Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon to Uber: Defining Employment in the
Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1673, 1686 (2016) (“[T]he significant influence that ondemand firms have over working conditions—from setting non-negotiable wage rates, to
implementing behavior codes, to ‘deactivating’ (i.e., firing) individuals who perform poorly—
reflects a more traditional employer-employee dynamic.”). Some platform operators allow
platform providers to set their own rates for their services. See, e.g., TASKRABBIT SUPPORT: HOW
PRICING WORKS, https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/en-us/articles/205313140-How-PricingWorks (last updated Sept. 23, 2017).
17. Martin Kenney & John Zysman, The Rise of the Platform Economy, 32 ISSUES IN SCI.
& TECH., Spring 2016, at 61, 62; see also Noam Scheiber, Uber Drivers and Others in the Gig
Economy Take a Stand, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2016), https://nyti.ms/23HRrKU (“In the rapid
growth of the online gig economy, many workers have felt squeezed and at times dehumanized
by a business structure that promises independence but often leaves them at the mercy of
increasingly powerful companies.”).
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A dearth of systematic information makes it difficult to estimate
confidently the size and scope of the platform economy.18 What is clear,
however, is that the platform economy has grown dramatically in recent
years.19 A 2016 study sponsored by the Center for Global Enterprise
reported that the largest 160 transaction platforms had a total market
capitalization of $1.1 trillion.20 Millions of workers now match up with
clients and consumers through platforms.21 The still nascent platform
economy has already radically transformed a variety of industries and
longstanding workplace arrangements, especially in the service
economy.22 Among the industries that have been most profoundly
affected are the transportation, hotel, and home repair and cleaning
industries.23
An oft-touted feature of the on-demand platform economy is the
worker’s increased control over her work schedule.24 Platform economy
providers commonly enjoy the freedom to determine for themselves
when and for how long they will work through the platform.25 The flip
18. TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 6–7.
19. See, e.g., id. at 2, 7–8 (“[S]tudies suggest that digital matching firms are quickly
growing in size, yet remain a relatively small part of the greater U.S. economy.”); MCKINSEY
GLOB. INST., INDEPENDENT WORK: CHOICE, NECESSITY, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 12–13 (2016),
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%20and%20Gro
wth/Independent%20work%20Choice%20necessity%20and%20the%20gig%20economy/Indepe
ndent-Work-Choice-necessity-and-the-gig-economy-Executive-Summary.ashx;
JPMORGAN
CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY 21 (2016),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/jpmc-institute-volatility-2-report.
pdf; Orly Lobel, The Gig Economy & the Future of Employment and Labor Law, 51 U.S.F. L.
REV. 51, 51 (2017) (“On-demand employment, also known as the Gig Economy, is growing at a
rapid rate along with the supply of gig workers who provide their labor on a short-term basis via
digital platform technologies.”); Katy Steinmetz, Exclusive: See How Big the Gig Economy Really
Is, TIME (Jan. 6, 2016), http://time.com/4169532/sharing-economy-poll/.
20. EVANS & GAWER, supra note 2, at 14.
21. TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 7; Steinmetz, supra note 19.
22. Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 86–90
(2015) (discussing Uber’s effect on the ride-hire sector); see EVANS & GAWER, supra note 2, at 4;
Lobel, supra note 11, at 95 (“The new generation of platform business is increasingly challenging
conventional industries in every realm. . . . Industries affected by the platform include [operators
in fifteen industries].”); Farhad Manjoo, Uber’s Business Model Could Change Your Work, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/technology/personaltech/uber-arising-business-model.html; see also Kenney & Zysman, supra note 17, at 61 (“Together [digital
platforms] are provoking reorganization of a wide variety of markets . . . .”).
23. TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 10; Lobel, supra note 11, at 95; Lobel, supra note 19, at
51–52.
24. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CONSUMER INTELLIGENCE SERIES: THE SHARING
ECONOMY 20 (2015) (“Among the sharing economy providers we spoke with, ‘flexibility’ was a
top two appeal of providing, close behind ‘a way to earn more money.’”); Manjoo, supra note 22.
25. Sarah Kessler, The Gig Economy Won’t Last Because It’s Being Sued to Death, FAST
COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.fastcompany.com/3042248/the-gig-economy-
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side of this flexibility is a more tenuous relationship between firm and
worker, with an increase in part-time and temporary work and a lack of
certain significant employment-related benefits.26 Platform operators
tend to classify—though some would say misclassify—the providers who
use their platforms as independent contractors, rather than as
employees.27 As discussed below,28 independent contractors lack certain
benefits and protections that employees may claim. There is growing
concern that platform operators are undercompensating the providers that
use their platforms and, more broadly, are undermining working
standards in the industries that the platform operators disrupt.29
Broadly speaking, this Article is concerned with the definition of
“employment” in the platform economy. More narrowly, this Article
considers the role that the platform operator’s right to exercise a certain
type and level of control over the provider engaged through its platform
should play in defining employment status. As discussed in detail
below,30 whether a firm enjoys the right to exercise control over a worker
has long been a central inquiry when courts determine whether the firm
is an employer and the worker its employee.31 Specifically, this Article
focuses on whether the platform operator’s right to impose quality control
wont-last-because-its-being-sued-to-death (“Thanks to these new on-demand startups, though,
whether you’re a stay-at-home mom with a few odd hours to spare or a recently unemployed fastfood worker who needs to make ends meet while looking for a job, you can work whenever you
want, doing whatever you want.”).
26. TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 14; Noam Scheiber, Growth in the ‘Gig Economy’ Fuels
Work Force Anxieties, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/
business/rising-economic-insecurity-tied-to-decades-long-trend-in-employment-practices.html;
Manjoo, supra note 22.
27. Greg Bensinger, Startups Scramble to Define ‘Employee,’ WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2015,
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startups-scramble-to-define-employee-1438228860;
Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co.: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking
the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork, 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 619, 637–41 (2016); see Cotter
v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The plaintiffs allege that because
[platform operator] Lyft misclassifies its drivers as independent contractors, the drivers have been
deprived of California’s minimum wage, reimbursement for work-related expenses, and other
protections that California law confers upon employees.”); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F.
Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (plaintiffs alleging that Uber misclassified them as
independent contractors, thus, denying them various statutory protections California law provides
for employees).
28. See discussion infra Section II.A.
29. Rogers, supra note 22, at 91, 101; Kevin Roose, Does Silicon Valley Have a ContractWorker Problem?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 18, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2014/09/silicon-valleys-contract-worker-problem.html.
30. See discussion infra Section II.B.
31. See, e.g., Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U.S. 220, 233–34 (1889) (explaining that a worker’s
right to control his own work schedule and efforts weighs in favor of finding the worker to be an
independent contractor and not an employee within the meaning of an Indiana lien statute).
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standards or conduct codes on the provider ought to weigh in favor of
imposing employment obligations that run in favor of the provider and
against the operator.
This Article uses the term “quality control standards” to mean
platform operator mandates that seek to maintain uniformity of service
and product across platform providers, as opposed to operator directions
with respect to a provider’s day-to-day operations. The line between the
two may be difficult to draw in some cases. Still, there is a body of case
law in the franchise context that has relied upon this distinction.32
Platform operators understand that consumers who use their platform
are sensitive to the quality of the service accessed through the platform.
Thus, platform operators seek to apply quality control standards to the
providers who perform work through their platform to ensure a minimum
level of service for the platform’s consumers.33 Often, the operators
enforce these standards by rough approximation by using consumers’
ratings of the platform providers from whom the consumers have
obtained a service or product.34 The critical issue is whether this type and
amount of control should weigh in favor of employee status for the
provider and employer status for the operator.
Significant costs to both the worker and the public arise from a failure
to extend the protections of workplace legislation to platform providers.35
For example, the platform worker who is classified as an independent
contractor and is injured on the job will not be covered by workers’
compensation insurance, and the public may bear much of the cost
relating to the injury.36 Indeed, figuring out how best to extend the
protections of workplace legislation to platform economy workers is a
principal employment law challenge confronting society and workplace
scholars. This Article argues, nonetheless, that—as a matter of statutory
32. See discussion infra Section III.C.
33. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1072–73, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(setting out quality control standards that Lyft imposes on drivers who use its platform, such as
requiring that the driver keep her car clean inside and out, ensure that the car seats and trunk are
clear for passenger use, and refrain from smoking in the car); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82
F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1149–50 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (listing quality control standards that Uber imposes
on the drivers that use its transaction platform, including instructions with respect to professional
dress and choice of radio programming (soft jazz or National Public Radio)).
34. See, e.g., Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1071, 1079 (noting that Lyft may block a driver from
using its transaction platform if the driver’s customer rating falls below a certain threshold);
O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1151 (“Uber documents make it clear that Uber uses these [customer]
ratings and feedback to monitor drivers and to discipline or terminate them.”); see also Lobel,
supra note 11, at 152 (“[Dynamic rating systems] incentivize consistently good service and
behavior.”).
35. See, e.g., Jennifer Pinsof, A New Take on an Old Problem: Employee Misclassification
in the Modern Gig-Economy, 22 MICH. TELECOMM & TECH. L. REV. 341, 353 (2016).
36. Id.
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interpretation and as a normative matter—weighing the platform
operator’s retention of the right to impose quality control standards on
the worker in favor of finding an employment relationship is not an
appropriate way forward.
This Article develops this argument below. Part I summarizes this
Article’s methodology and structural-purposive analysis. Part II
discusses the consequences of the employee/independent contractor
classification—for the worker and the firm—and sets out the traditional
framework that U.S. workplace law uses to classify workers as employees
or, alternatively, as independent contractors.37 Part II also briefly
examines how courts have applied this framework in the context of
platform economy providers and the frustrations that have arisen from the
traditional framework’s application to an innovative workplace model.38
Part III identifies the control bargain implicit in the structure of U.S.
workplace regulation.39 Next, Part III demonstrates various ways in
which platform providers, as well as platform operators and consumers,
might directly benefit from a platform operator’s imposition of quality
control standards.40 Finally, Part III argues that, in light of the control
bargain, the imposition of quality control standards by platform operators
should not weigh in favor of employee status with respect to platform
economy providers who benefit directly from the imposition of such
standards.41 This argument is informed by an analysis of relevant
workplace structures and case law arising in the franchise context.42
I. A S TRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS
In general, courts have split on the issue of whether a firm’s right to
impose quality control standards on a worker should weigh in favor of
finding that the firm employs the worker.43 In the specific context of the
37. See infra notes 71–102 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 108–20 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 121–40 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 141–53 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 154–82 and accompanying text.
43. Cf. Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 2014)
(“FedEx’s detailed appearance requirements [including with respect to clothing, hair style, facial
hair, and body odor] clearly constitute control over its drivers.”), and Scantland v. Jeffrey Knight,
Inc., 721 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting firm’s argument that because its quality
control standards arose from “the nature of the business” such standards should not be relevant to
an economic dependence analysis), and Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66,
81–82, 85 (Kan. 2014) (“[R]equiring a driver to wear clothes of a certain type or exit the delivery
vehicle in a certain manner is clearly exercising control over the manner and means by which
packages are picked up or delivered. . . . [and] point[s] to an employer/employee relationship.”),
with FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[A] uniform
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platform economy, there is little case law on point. In two recent highprofile class actions, one against Uber and one against its ridesharing
competitor, Lyft, both courts held that, under California law, the platform
operator’s right to impose quality control standards on drivers weighs in
favor of finding that the drivers are employees of the platform operator.44
Moreover, current law generally does not concern itself with who
benefits from the firm’s control of the worker. That is to say, the firm’s
retention of the right to exercise control over the worker may weigh in
favor of finding the worker to be the firm’s employee even if the worker
herself—along with the firm and the public—directly benefits from the
firm’s exercise of control. This approach is questionable in that it may
encourage firms to sacrifice control in the structuring of working
relationships even when the firm, the worker, and society would all be
better off with greater firm control.45
With respect to workplace protective regulation, the classification of
platform economy providers as employees, who fall within the scope of
such regulation, or as independent contractors, who fall outside the scope,
is ultimately a question of legislative intent.46 Typically, however, the
requirement often at least in part ‘is intended to ensure customer security rather than to control
the [driver].’ . . . And once a driver wears a FedEx logo, FedEx has an interest in making sure her
conduct reflects favorably on that logo, for instance by her being a safe and insured
driver . . . [which] are “constraints imposed by customer demands and . . . do not determine the
employment relationship.” (second alteration in original)), and id. at 503 (“True, these
drivers . . . must wear uniforms and the like, but a rule based on concern for customer service does
not create an employee relationship.”), and Mission Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 123
Cal. App. 3d 211, 221 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“But the fact that [the firm] prescribed standards
of performance and that the applicant on occasion attended lectures or classes concerning proper
methods of installation and service was not evidence that [the firm] controlled the manner in
which the desired result was to be achieved.”).
The U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division has rejected the argument that a
firm’s imposition of quality control standards that are inherent to the nature of the firm’s business
ought not to weigh in favor of employee status. DAVID WEIL, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2015-1, at 9 (2015), https://www.blr.com/html_email/
AI2015-1.pdf.
44. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078–79 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1150–52 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Berwick v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, 2015 WL 4153765, at * 6 (Cal. Dept. Lab. June 3, 2015) (hearing
officer weighing the platform operator’s imposition of quality control standards as a factor
suggesting that the operator was the platform provider’s employer).
45. See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 405–06
(Cal. 1989) (noting that the definition of “employment” embodied in California’s workers’
compensation statute “must be applied with deference to the purposes of the protective
legislation” and that federal case law “deem[s] the traditional ‘control’ test pertinent to a more
general assessment whether the overall nature of the service arrangement is one which the
protective statute was intended to cover”).
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relevant workplace legislation fails to define “employee” or “employer”
meaningfully.47 Moreover, with respect to much workplace protective
legislation, the relevant legislative histories offer little guidance.48
Compounding this uncertainty, most workplace regulation was enacted
long before the rise of the innovative workplace structures associated
with the platform economy. Thus, the challenge addressed by this Article
is to construct the intent of legislators who enacted workplace protective
legislation to discern how those legislators would apply that legislation
in a platform economy context.
In the absence of legislative clarity, courts tasked with classifying
platform economy providers are likely to default to application of one of
two generic standards: the common law test of agency or the economic
realities test. The courts themselves, as well as academic commentators,
however, have decried these standards as outmoded in the context of the
platform economy.49 Still, the courts in the recent Uber and Lyft litigation
mechanically applied these standards to the classification of platform
economy providers.50
In considering the significance of a platform operator’s imposition of
quality control standards on a platform economy provider to the
classification of that provider, this Article steps back from the specific
criteria of the generic standards. Further, this Article forgoes the textualist
and intentionalist methods of statutory interpretation. As noted above,
with respect to most workplace protective legislation, neither the
statutory text nor legislative history of the statute under consideration
provides reliable indicators of legislative intent with respect to the
meaning of “employment” in the platform economy.
Rather, this Article employs a broad structural analysis. Specifically,
in seeking to interpret “employment” in the context of the platform
economy, this Article focuses on the structure of workplace protective
regulation generally, as well as on the structure of the platform economy
that is being regulated. Further, the analysis is informed by case law

47. See infra notes 85–87 and accompanying text.
48. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides a somewhat more useful definition of
employment and a richer legislative history than do most federal workplace protective statutes.
See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992). Moreover, several other
federal workplace protective statutes adopt the FLSA’s definition of employment. See Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(5) (2012); Family and
Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012).
49. See, e.g., Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back
to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 493 (2016).
50. See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1078–81 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1148–53 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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addressing the meaning of “employment” in the similar context of the
franchisor-franchisee relationship.51
This Article labels this structural analysis a “structural-purposive”
inquiry, principally because the analysis relies heavily on public policy
arguments. The purposive label also emphasizes the argument’s
agreement with the cardinal principal that a court’s object in interpreting
a statute should be enforcing the legislature’s intent.52
Structural analysis examines relationships in order to derive
meaning.53 Thus, when interpreting a statute, one might consider
structure in various ways.54 First, in interpreting statutory language, one
might consider how the language at issue is situated within a sentence, a
section, or the statute as a whole.55 As Judge Kenneth Starr has put it,
“Answers may emerge from a study of the whole [statute] that might not
be suggested by a narrowly focused parsing of a solitary provision in a
complex statute.”56
Second, the relationship between two or more separate statutes might
inform one’s interpretation of statutory language. For example, one might
find meaning in the placement of a statute within a particular code.57
Also, such an interstatutory analysis would likely be helpful in most field
preemption inquiries.58 In addition, one might focus on similarities in

51. See infra notes 154–82 and accompanying text.
52. But see Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure and Structuralism in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1543 (1994) (“For a structuralist, a statute is not a fixed dictate
from a superior organ of government that mandates unquestioned obedience. A statute, rather, is
an interactive engagement among legislators, administrators, the judiciary, and the regulated.”
(footnote omitted)).
53. Id. at 1463.
54. See generally Kenneth W. Starr, Of Forests and Trees: Structuralism in the
Interpretation of Statutes, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706–08 (1988) (noting that a court can
consider the structural relationship between two statutes, compare a current statute to a prior
version, or interpret individual parts of a statute by viewing them in the context of the entire
statute).
55. United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A
provision [of a statute] that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes
its meaning clear or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect
that is compatible with the rest of the law.” (citation omitted)); George H. Taylor, Structural
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 341–54 (1995); Chibundu, supra note 52, at 1463–64.
56. Starr, supra note 54, at 708; see also id. at 706 (“[S]tatutes are to be studied carefully,
as a whole, and with due regard for the structure of the statutory edifice and the interpretive lessons
to be drawn from that edifice.”).
57. Chibundu, supra note 52, at 1464.
58. Starr, supra note 54, at 707 (“[W]e have seen structural analysis take on considerable
importance in preemption cases, especially with the courts’ focusing on the comprehensiveness
of Congress’s regulatory regime.”).
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language, approach, or purpose between two or more statutes, and on the
case law interpreting the statute or statutes relied upon for reference.59
Professor Maxwell O. Chibundu has commented on the utility of
interstatutory structural analysis:
The structural relevance of other statutes to the interpretive
process may be derived either from the similarity or
dissimilarity of language—whether in terms of the words
chosen or the internal organization of the provisions—or
from a desire to create an intellectually coherent corpus in
the sense of filling in most of the gaps while eliminating as
many redundancies as possible.60
Chibundu further points out that while the former use is a textual
analysis,61 the latter use is purposive.62 This Article’s structural analysis
is more purposive than textual in the way it seeks to derive meaning from
the overarching objectives of a range of workplace protective legislation.
Further, this Article’s structural analysis broadly encompasses
consideration of the statute’s effect on the entities that the statute
regulates.
From this broad structural-purposive inquiry, this Article first
identifies a “control bargain” implicit in the structure of workplace
protective regulation. As detailed below,63 the state agrees to exempt a
firm from protective workplace regulation provided that the firm and its
worker arrive at an arrangement pursuant to which the firm does not
control the means and manner of the worker’s performance.
Alternatively, the firm may exercise a certain level of control over its
worker but, in exchange, the state will impose workplace protective
regulations upon the firm.64 This control bargain can be seen from the
time of the earliest U.S. workplace protective regulation, as well as across
foreign jurisdictions.65

59. See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 909–12 (1989) (interpreting the
statute of limitations provision of section 706(e) of Title VII by examining the NLRA’s statute of
limitations provision, including language common to the two statutes, the unusual requirement of
an administrative complaint before a civil action may be filed common to both statutes, and the
cases interpreting the NLRA’s statute of limitations), superseded by statute as stated in Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 652 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60. Chibundu, supra note 52, at 1464.
61. For a discussion of the structural textualist approach to statutory interpretation, see
generally Taylor, supra note 55 (emphasizing the benefits of textualism and its focus on textuality,
textual structure, and textual conduct).
62. Chibundu, supra note 52, at 1464.
63. See infra notes 108–20 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 108–20 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 108–15 and accompanying text.
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Various elements of the common law test (which, despite the name, is
frequently applied in statutory analysis) and the economic realities test
function to implement the control bargain.66 Still, the control bargain
should be thought of as a separate construct. This construct is helpful in
understanding the legislative intent behind certain protective workplace
legislation, particularly where such legislation predates the advent of the
platform economy. The control bargain construct allows for a helpful and
less formalistic inquiry into how the state and the firm would structure
the control bargain in the platform economy.67
A focus on the nature of the platform economy also informs the broad
structural-purposive inquiry. Quality control standards and the rating
systems that enforce them by rough approximation are inherent to the
nature of the platform economy. Professor Orly Lobel has explained how
dynamic quality monitoring (and, implicitly, quality control standards) in
the platform economy reduce transaction costs arising from information
asymmetries:
Consumers do not know the quality of the experience they
are paying for until they actually consume it; individuals are
not familiar with the service they pay for until after they
complete the transaction. To combat this, the platform offers
dynamic ratings, reviews, and information, which reduce
uncertainty and deepen consumer confidence. It also reduces
monitoring costs because the certainty that one will receive
a bad review creates ex-ante incentives to comply with the
terms of the deal.68
Thus, quality control standards are essential to leverage the network
effects that allow the platform to flourish. At the same time, they mitigate
the free-rider problem that would otherwise arise if a platform provider
were allowed to use the platform and its good reputation without living
up to the platform’s standards that are necessary to maintain that
reputation.69 Accordingly, platform economy providers benefit directly
from the imposition of quality control standards in that such standards
help grow the providers’ market.70
Application of the control bargain construct supports the argument
that a platform operator’s imposition of quality control standards on a
provider should not weigh in favor of employee/employer status where
the provider herself directly benefits from the quality control standards,
along with the platform operator and the platform consumer. As a matter
66. See infra notes 93–102 and accompanying text.
67. See Starr, supra note 54, at 706 (“[S]tructuralism provides a useful mechanism for
getting at Congress’s intent.”).
68. Lobel, supra note 11, at 112.
69. See infra notes 132–39 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 132–39 and accompanying text.
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of legislative intent, the legislature is unlikely to wish to impose
workplace regulation that discourages firm behavior that directly benefits
all concerned. Therefore, the legislature would be unlikely to enter into a
control bargain that includes sanctions against a firm for beneficial firm
behavior. Thus, the law should not convey additional advantages on the
platform provider or penalize the platform operator because of the
beneficial control. This is especially so when the public also benefits from
the operator’s control of the provider.
II. APPLICATION OF THE TRADITIONAL WORKER CLASSIFICATION
FRAMEWORK TO P LATFORM ECONOMY PROVIDERS
An appreciation of the traditional framework used by U.S. workplace
law to classify workers as employees or as independent contractors is
critical to fully understanding the argument set out in Part I. An
appreciation of the consequences of these classifications, for workers and
for firms, is of similarly crucial importance. Part II sets out this
framework and discusses the consequences of classifying a worker as an
employee or as an independent contractor.
A. The Consequences of “Employment” for the
Worker and the Firm
Whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor in
relation to a firm has far-reaching consequences for both the worker and
the firm.71 For example, pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior,
an employer is vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its employee
when such conduct is committed within the scope of her employment.72
In contrast, a firm is generally not liable for the torts of its independent
contractor.73 The theory grounding this assignment of liability is that
control over the means and manner of a worker’s performance—which
gives rise to the classification of the worker as an employee and the firm
as an employer—renders a firm well-positioned to protect third parties
from a worker’s tortious conduct.74 This assignment of vicarious liability
71. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A
Historical and Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
153, 162–63, 166 (2003).
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
73. Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342, 346 (Me. 2010) (“Because an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of its employees, but is not usually responsible for the
negligence of independent contractors, a prerequisite to imposing vicarious liability is the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.” (citation omitted)).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Respondeat superior creates an
incentive for principals to choose employees and structure work within the organization so as to

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/5

14

Spitko: A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the Plat

2018]

A STRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF “EMPLOYMENT”

423

also incentivizes an employer to ensure that its employee takes reasonable
care in carrying out her duties.75
Further, most federal and state statutory protections for workers apply
to employees and not to independent contractors.76 Thus, the employee,
but not the independent contractor, may claim protections under federal
anti-discrimination statutes;77 wage, hour, and benefit laws;78 and family
leave legislation.79 Similarly, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
protects the right of employees “to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”80 The
NLRA does not extend these protections to independent contractors.81
Further, a firm is generally responsible for payroll taxes, payments for
workers’ compensation plans, and unemployment insurance
contributions with respect to its employees, but not with respect to its
independent contractors.82

reduce the incidence of tortious conduct.”); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations,
769 P.2d 399, 403 (Cal. 1989).
75. Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 336 (Wis. 2004) (“Exposure to
vicarious liability creates an incentive for masters who control or have the right to control the
conduct of their servants to take steps to ensure that their servants exercise due care in carrying
out the master’s business.”).
76. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“California law
gives many benefits and protections to employees; independent contractors get virtually none.”);
Befort, supra note 71, at 162–63, 166.
77. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2012); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012). But see 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race and alienage in contracting).
78. See Employee Retirement and Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(5)–(6) (2012);
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–202 (2012).
79. See Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2012).
80. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
81. Id. § 152(3) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ . . . shall not include . . . any individual
having the status of an independent contractor . . . .”); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2012).
82. Cotter v. Lyft, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing California statutory
law with respect to this point); Befort, supra note 71, at 163. Other consequences that flow from
the classification of a worker as an employee would tend to encourage a firm to organize its
workforce so that certain workers are more likely to be found to be employees of the firm. For
example, an employee owes a duty of loyalty to her employer that an independent contractor does
not. Thus, limitations exist on the ability of an employee to compete with her employer while an
independent contractor is under no such limitations with respect to the firm. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN,
RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A. SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING
AND ITS LIMITATIONS 15–16 (2d ed. 2011). Also, the firm is the default owner of certain
intellectual property created by its employees, but not its independent contractors, in the course
of their employment. Id. at 471–74.
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Given the consequences that follow from the classification of a worker
as either an employee or an independent contractor, workplace advocates,
scholars, and courts tend to focus their attention, perhaps excessively, on
the precise question of whether a certain worker or type of worker
qualifies as an employee. With respect to protective workplace
regulation, the line that the law draws between employee and independent
contractor is meant to separate vulnerable workers who are most in need
of protective workplace regulation with respect to a firm from workers
who are better able to protect themselves with respect to a firm.83 A
narrow focus on the employee/independent contractor distinction,
however, can actually obscure the predicate question of whether
workplace law ought to offer various protections to a certain worker or
type of worker.84 This Article seeks to relate this normative question to
the very definition of employment with respect to platform economy
providers in relation to the platform operator’s imposition of quality
control standards.
B. The Traditional Framework for Classifying Workers as
Employees or as Independent Contractors
Most federal and state statutes regulating the workplace fail to provide
a helpful definition of “employer” or “employee.”85 Consequently, courts
83. Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of
Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 358–59, 375–76 (2002).
84. JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER 4 (2015) (“As long as attention
remains focused on the employee category and related secondary conceptions alone, it will be
very difficult to address the relevant questions at all.”); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification:
Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 279, 289 (2011) (“The right question to ask is . . . to what extent should firms be able
to choose organizational structures that preclude unionization by avoiding having employeremployee relationships at all.”); id. at 294 (“[The question] tends to be obscured by our endless
wrangling over who is an employee and who is an independent contractor.”); see Davidov, supra
note 83, at 359–60 (lamenting “the situation in Britain and in many other countries, where courts
still decide the scope of labour and employment regulations in a formalistic manner, without
consideration of the purpose of the regulation in question” (emphasis in original)); id. at 401
(“Experience has taught us that the purpose behind the employee/independent contractor
distinction—the basic goals of differentiating some (more vulnerable) workers from others—is
often forgotten all too quickly.”).
85. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. 203(e)(1) (2012) (“[T]he term
‘employee’ means any individual employed by an employer.”); Americans with Disabilities Act,
42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) (2012) (“The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by an
employer.”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(j)(4)(A) (West 2016) (“[E]mployer means any person
regularly employing one or more persons.”); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells,
538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003) (remarking that the definition of employee in the ADA is merely a
“nominal definition” that is “circular” (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 323 (1992)); Darden, 503 U.S. at 322 (“We have often been asked to construe the meaning
of ‘employee’ where the statute containing the term does not helpfully define it.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/5

16

Spitko: A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the Plat

2018]

A STRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF “EMPLOYMENT”

425

interpreting such statutes tend to default to the common law of agency’s
definitions of employer and employee86 or, especially in the context of
social welfare legislation such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, to the
definitions of employer and employee provided for by the “economic
realities” test.87 Although most everyone agrees that the economic
realities test is broader than the common law test,88 the two tests tend to
yield a roughly similar result.89 The tests focus, respectively, on the extent
to which the firm enjoys the right to control the worker and the extent to
which the worker is economically dependent upon the firm.90 Thus, U.S.
workplace law is similar to that of many foreign legal systems in that it
focuses on worker subordination and economic dependence when
determining the existence of an employment relationship.91
The common law standard defining employment arose within the
context of determining a master’s respondeat superior tort liability.92 The
common law standard is a multi-factor test, the primary inquiry of which
is the extent to which the firm controls or has the right to control the
manner in which the worker performs the job, as opposed to controlling
or having the right to control merely the result of the work.93 Thus, the
Restatement (Third) of Agency provides that “an employee is an agent
whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means
of the agent’s performance of work.”94
In determining whether a firm is an employer and a worker an
employee, courts applying the common law test also focus on a host of
subsidiary, nonexclusive factors other than firm direct control. These
factors include how the firm and the worker understand the nature of their
86. See, e.g., Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 445, 448 (discussing the ADA’s definition of
employee); Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–23 (discussing ERISA’s definition of employee); Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989) (discussing the Copyright Act);
NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (discussing the National Labor
Relations Act); Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 743 (Cal. 2014) (Werdegar, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
87. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
88. See, e.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 325–26 (rejecting application of the economic realities
test as broader than the common law test); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d
1033, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The economic-realities test is broader than the right-to-control
test.”).
89. Davidov, supra note 83, at 365; Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of
Employment Law? Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise
Disaggregation, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 216 (2011).
90. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947).
91. Davidov, supra note 83, at 365.
92. MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 133–70 (1989); Davidov, supra note 83, at 366 n.29.
93. See, e.g., Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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relationship, the duration of the work relationship, the skill the work
requires, whether the firm or the worker supplies the instrumentalities of
the work, whether the work is part of the firm’s regular business, and
whether the worker “is engaged in a distinct occupation or business.”95 A
consensus is lacking as to whether these factors are independent of the
principal control inquiry or are merely additional ways to gauge the
extent of the firm’s control over the worker. At least some of these factors
speak to the firm’s indirect “bureaucratic control” over the worker.96
The economic realities test for determining the status of employer and
employee is also a multi-factor test. The principal focus of the test is
whether, “as a matter of economic reality,” the worker is dependent upon
the firm to which the worker renders her service.97 Factors relevant to this
inquiry include the duration of the relationship between the worker and
the firm, the level of skill the work requires, the worker’s opportunity for
profit or loss arising from the work, and the extent to which the work the
employee performs is an integral part of the firm’s business.98 The nature
and degree of the firm’s control over the manner in which the worker
performs her work is also an important factor in the economic realities
test.99
In sum, under both the common law and the economic realities tests
for determining a worker’s employee/independent contractor status, the
degree of control the firm exercises or has the right to exercise over the
worker’s performance of her duties is a critical factor.100 The firm’s right
to exercise control is the principal factor under the common law test;101
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992); Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers,
Inc., 327 P.3d 165, 171 (Cal. 2014); Borello, 769 P.2d at 404.
96. Ayala, 327 P.3d at 176–77 (“[Some secondary factors may only be] relevant to support
an inference that the hiree is, or is not, subject to the hirer’s direction and control.” (citation
omitted)); Davidov, supra note 83, at 366–67; see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362
N.L.R.B. 186 (2015) (Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting) (“The [secondary] factors provide
useful indicia of the putative employer’s direct-and-immediate control, or its right to control.”).
97. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704,
713–19 (1947).
98. Bartels, 332 U.S. at 130; Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir.
1988).
99. See Brock, 840 F.2d at 1059; Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539–40 (7th
Cir. 1987); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 16, at 1705 (2016) (“But even though various
factors appear in these assorted employment definitions, the concept of control remains constant
in both the common law and economic realities tests.”).
100. Glynn, supra note 89, at 203 (“Statutory protections for workers, including wage and
hour laws, impose duties only on ‘employers,’ which, despite variation in the underlying tests,
ultimately hinges on how much control a firm exercises over the work.”).
101. Ayala, 327 P.2d at 169 (“Whether a common law employer-employee relationship
exists turns foremost on the degree of a hirer’s right to control how the end result is achieved.”).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/5

18

Spitko: A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the Plat

2018]

A STRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF “EMPLOYMENT”

427

the firm’s right to exercise control is a central factor under the economic
realities test.102
C. Difficulties Arising from the Application of the Traditional
Framework for Classifying Workers to a Platform
Economy Workplace
Courts and commentators alike have lamented that the traditional test
for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent
contractor is outmoded and ill-suited to determining worker status in the
platform economy.103 In recent litigation challenging platform operator
Lyft’s classification of drivers who use its transaction platform, the
federal district court judge remarked, “the jury in this case will be handed
a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes. The test the
California courts have developed over the 20th Century for classifying
workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century problem.”104
Similarly, in a worker classification class action filed against Uber, the
federal district court judge suggested that “many of the factors in [the
traditional] test appear outmoded” as applied to the platform economy
and further opined that, “[t]he application of the traditional test of
employment—a test which evolved under an economic model very
different from the new ‘sharing economy’—to Uber’s business model
creates significant challenges.”105
In light of these concerns, the question of how best to distinguish
between employee and independent contractor with respect to providers
engaged through a transaction platform has recently become the focus of
a great deal of scholarly attention.106 Workplace law scholars have
offered a variety of proposals to fundamentally alter existing standards
102. Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 76 (Kan. 2014) (“The primary
distinction between the right to control test and the economic reality test is that under the latter,
the right to control is not considered the single most important factor in determining the worker’s
status.”).
103. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2015); O’Connor v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Martin Kenney & John Zysman,
Choosing a Future in the Platform Economy: The Implications and Consequences of Digital
Platforms 4 (Berkeley Roundtable on the Int’l Econ. (BRIE, 2015)), http://www.brie.
berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PlatformEconomy2 DistributeJune21.pdf.
104. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.
105. O’Connor, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1153.
106. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 16, at 1678 (2016) (“[C]ourts [should]
rethink three aspects of workplace control . . . the subjects of control, the direction of control, and
the obligations of control to accurately delineate the reach of the nation’s core workplace
protections.”); Lobel, supra note 19, at 61 (asserting that “the problem at the heart of classification
disputes is not the newness of the Gig Economy, but rather the inherent complexity of the existing
legal classification” and arguing for clarification and simplification of the doctrine).
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for defining employment in the platform economy.107 This Article, in
contrast, does not propose any global changes to the existing framework
for worker classification. Rather, in considering how best to balance the
need to protect platform providers with the goals of promoting the
welfare of platform consumers and enabling platform operators and the
platform economy to thrive, this Article suggests a significant refinement
in the application of the existing framework: A platform operator’s right
to impose quality control standards on providers who are engaged
through its platform should not weigh in favor of a finding of
employee/employer status when the providers themselves, as well as the
public and the operator, directly benefit from the quality control
standards.
III. THE CONTROL BARGAIN AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO A
PLATFORM OPERATOR’S IMPOSITION OF
QUALITY CONTROL S TANDARDS
The rationale for this Article’s suggested refinement is grounded in
the control bargain implicit in the structure of U.S. workplace regulation.
In Part III, this Article turns to identification of the control bargain and
an explication of its relevance to the classification of providers in the
platform economy.
A. Identification of the Control Bargain
The structure of U.S. protective workplace regulation suggests an
implicit bargain between firms and their workers, centering on control
over the worker. Pursuant to this control bargain, the worker agrees to
subordinate herself to the firm’s control with regard to the means and
manner of her performance. In exchange, the firm subjects itself to
extensive protective workplace regulation that otherwise would not apply
with respect to the worker. Thus, the worker bargains to give up control
107. See, e.g., Benjamin Means & Joseph A. Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2016) (arguing that the critical inquiry in determining the classification
of workers as employees or independent contractors should be the degree of flexibility the workers
have in choosing “the time, place, price, manner, and frequency” of the their work as such
flexibility is a means to evaluate the degree of the employer’s control); Brishen Rogers,
Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
479, 496 (2016) (“[E]mployment law duties should be levied where doing so will discourage
domination of workers by companies or by market forces.”); see also Prassl & Risak, supra note
27, at 647 (proposing a functional conceptualization of the employer, pursuant to which “the
concept of the employer should be understood as the entity, or combination of entities, playing a
decisive role in the exercise of relational employing functions, and regulated or controlled as such
in each particular domain of employment law”); Cf. Lobel, supra note 11, at 136 (“Contemporary
realities may necessitate extending protections we find valuable as a society—dignity and antidiscrimination principles, whistleblowing protections, insurance and portable benefits, and
occupational health and safety—to all laborers regardless of their employment status.”).
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in exchange for workplace protections, and the firm bargains to gain
control in exchange for the assumption of workplace obligations.
In reality, most workers have relatively little bargaining power vis-àvis their employer or potential employer. The state, however, is in a much
stronger bargaining position with respect to the firms that it may regulate.
Thus, the control bargain is one that the state strikes with the firm on
behalf of workers or, more precisely, helps workers to strike with the
firm. With respect to any particular worker, the state agrees to exempt a
firm from protective workplace regulation provided that the firm and its
worker arrive at an arrangement pursuant to which the firm does not
control the means and or manner of the worker’s performance.
Alternatively, the firm may exercise a certain type and level of control
over its worker but, in exchange, the state will impose workplace
protective regulations upon the firm. The worker who agrees to the latter
arrangement gives up control but gains the workplace protections
imposed by the state. French employment scholar Jean-Christian Vinel
has identified this trade-off—what this Article labels the control
bargain—in both French and U.S. workplace law.108 Speaking of U.S.
workplace law, Vinel writes, “Progressive laws strengthened the inequity
of the wage bargain by making it the source of a number of social rights
that were trade-offs for the worker’s social and technical submission to
the new industrial order.”109
Other scholars of foreign workplace law also have identified this
trade-off in legal systems outside of the United States.110 The comparison
to foreign legal systems is apt, given that workplace law in many foreign
legal systems shares with U.S. workplace law a focus on worker
subordination and economic dependence when determining the existence
of an employment relationship.111 French legal scholar Alain Supiot
describes the tradeoff between worker dependence on the firm and state
regulation of the firm that developed under European workplace law:
Under the model of the welfare state, the work relationship
became the site on which a fundamental trade-off between
economic dependence and social protection took place.
While it was of course the case that the employee was
subjected to the power of another, it was understood that, in

108. JEAN-CHRISTIAN VINEL, THE EMPLOYEE: A POLITICAL HISTORY 37–39 (2013).
109. Id. at 37 (“[I]n protecting some workers from the overweening power of their
employers, such laws [limiting working hours] also, sub silentio, legitimized and objectivized the
workers’ lack of discretion on the job and their submission to managerial rule.”).
110. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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return, there was a guarantee of the basic conditions for
participation in society.112
Similarly, speaking of English workplace law, Professor Jeremias
Prassl argues that “the concept of the employer . . . serves as the
attachment point for regulation which ensures the trade-off between
economic dependence and social protection.”113 Prassl describes how
what is in essence a control bargain evolved from the United Kingdom’s
Employers’ Liability Act of 1880, which enabled workers who have been
injured by the negligence of a fellow employee to recover from their
employer.114 Prassl notes that this fundamental trade-off, between worker
subordination to the firm’s managerial power and firm responsibility for
worker social welfare, “continues to exert considerable force.”115
Returning to U.S. workplace law, the firm’s ability to structure its
workforce so as to opt out of various protective workplace regulations
provides evidence of the control bargain. This freedom to opt out even
extends to workplace statutes that further the anti-discrimination
principle. For example, the firm that forgoes control over the means and
manner of the worker’s performance such that its worker is found to be
an independent contractor is not subject to Title VII’s prohibition on sex
discrimination.116 The firm is then free under federal statutory law to
discriminate against its worker on the basis of sex in a way that would
give rise to liability were she the firm’s employee.117
Evidence of the worker’s ability to participate in control bargaining
can be seen, for example, in the trade-off between worker autonomy and
worker protections found in the structure of the Taft-Hartley Act. The
Taft-Hartley Act excludes forepersons and supervisors from its
protections for those joining a union and, indeed, from being part of a
bargaining unit.118 This trade-off can be seen as the product of a control
bargain. The worker retains her status as an employee when she ascends
to the role of supervisor. Still, the worker who ascends to the role of
supervisor, which the Act defines to include the exercise of significant

112. PRASSL, supra note 84, at 112.
113. Id. at 229.
114. Id. at 212 (“Having gained a foothold in the liability of employers for injuries caused
by managerial or superior staff, this latter ‘principle that the employer should assume
responsibility for the social and economic risks arising from the employment relationship began
to take shape.’” (footnote omitted)).
115. Id.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of N.C., N.A., 259 F.3d
309, 313 (4th Cir. 2001).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Farlow, 259 F.3d at 313.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol70/iss2/5

22

Spitko: A Structural-Purposive Interpretation of “Employment” in the Plat

2018]

A STRUCTURAL-PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION OF “EMPLOYMENT”

431

authority requiring the use of independent judgment,119 gains more
autonomy in her work performance and is subject to less firm supervision.
In exchange, the supervisor gives up certain rights against the firm.120
B. Implications of the Control Bargain for Classification of
Platform Economy Providers
The control bargain is a useful construct for analyzing whether a
platform operator’s right to impose quality control standards on the
providers engaged through its platform should weigh in favor of
employee status for the provider and employer status for the operator.
The construct aids in thinking through the normative question of what the
law should be and informs the question of legislative intent.
This Article’s arguments with respect to both the normative question
and likely legislative intent are predicated upon the conclusion that the
platform operator, consumer, and provider are all better off when the
platform operator retains the right to impose quality control standards on
the provider. Thus, this Article next seeks to demonstrate that this
predicate conclusion is correct. This Article will then return to the
normative argument and the question of legislative intent.
1. The Benefits to Platform Economy Operators, Consumers,
and Providers from the Operator’s Imposition of
Quality Control Standards
Trust between consumers and providers is critical to the success of the
platform economy.121 Consumers must be confident that their platform
transactions will be consistently completed safely and to their
satisfaction. As the authors of a 2015 PricewaterhouseCoopers analysis
of the “sharing economy” concluded, “[y]es, convenience and cost
savings are beacons, but what ultimately keeps this economy spinning—
119. Id. § 152(11) (“The term ‘supervisor’ means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances,
or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the forgoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment.”).
120. See VINEL, supra note 108, at 141 (“[T]he right to organize was not a universal social
right of the wage or salary worker, but rather a kind of compensation for factory workers who
accepted the strict work regime of the mass-production system.”).
121. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 24, at 9 (reporting that 89 percent of U.S. adults
familiar with the “sharing economy” agree that its success is “based on trust between providers
and users”); The Future of Work: There’s an App for That, ECONOMIST (Jan. 3, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/node/21637355/print (“One key [to enable the platform operator to
exploit low transaction costs] is providing the sort of trust that encourages people to take a punt
on the unfamiliar.”).
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and growing—is trust. It’s the elixir that enables us to feel reassured
about staying in a stranger’s home or hitching a ride from someone we’ve
never met.”122 Quality control standards and the ability to enforce those
standards are key to building and maintaining that trust.123
For the platform operator, the imposition of quality control standards
is an essential means to protect its brand. The platform, in essence, is a
marketplace that facilitates the coming together of a consumer and a
provider. The consumer who enjoys a positive experience with the
provider she engages through the platform is more likely to return to the
marketplace—to use the platform again—than is the consumer who has
a negative experience with the provider.124
Consider, for example, the passenger who uses a transportation
platform to engage a driver to transport her and her friends to the airport.
The platform operator does not impose quality control standards on the
drivers who are engaged through the platform. The driver arrives in a car
that has no available trunk space and smells of cigarette smoke. The
consumer and her fellow passengers are forced to situate their luggage on
their laps for the duration of the journey and arrive at the airport smelling
like cigarette smoke. Assume also that a competitor transportation
platform imposes and enforces quality control standards on the drivers
who are engaged through its platform. These quality control standards
include a requirement that the driver’s car be free of cigarette smoke
odors and provide ample trunk space. One might reasonably posit that the
consumer and her fellow passengers are likely to migrate to the
competitor platform.
The hypothetical scenario above also demonstrates how the consumer
benefits from the platform operator’s right to impose and enforce quality
control standards on the provider who uses its platform. Transaction
platforms reduce search costs in the pre-deal stage, bargaining and
decision costs in the deal-making stage, and policing and enforcement
costs in the post-deal stage by means of highly efficient matching and

122. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 24, at 16; see Lobel, supra note 11, at 153
(“The identification, review, and ratings systems in turn create reciprocal trust that is multilayered: trust in participants; in value exchanged; in platform/network.”).
123. See TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 14; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 24, at 12.
124. See Ellen Huet, What Really Killed Homejoy? It Couldn’t Hold on to Its Customers,
FORBES (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/what-really-killedhomejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers/#63c8acb4114c (former operations manager of the
now defunct platform operator Homejoy stating that the firm’s concerns about being found to be
the employer of home cleaners retained through the Homejoy platform “affected our ability to put
together a strong product, since we couldn’t train or equip our cleaners, which in turn led to
average customer experiences and low customer retention”).
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dynamic quality monitoring.125 Platforms thus allow for more efficient
use of capital.126
Again, Uber provides a positive example. The Uber platform makes it
significantly easier for the consumer (a potential passenger looking for a
ride-share driver) and the provider (a ride-share driver looking for a
potential passenger) to find each other, to negotiate the specifics of their
transaction, and to promote the likelihood of consumer and provider
satisfaction with the transaction.127 Thus, Uber also makes the
consumer’s choice to forgo owning an automobile significantly more
practical, especially when the consumer resides in an urban area.128 These
efficiencies, however, depend on the platform operator’s imposition and
enforcement of quality control standards.129 Firm-imposed quality
control standards help to ensure that the consumer receives a similar,
positive experience each time she uses the platform operator to engage a
provider.130 Absent such assurance, the consumer may be better off
forgoing the platform altogether.
The case that platform operators and consumers directly benefit from
the firm’s imposition and enforcement of quality control standards is an
easy one to make. The case with respect to platform providers is more
complicated. In most instances where a firm exercises control over its
worker, the worker benefits only indirectly, if at all. For example, where
the firm requires that the worker work the specific hours that the firm
schedules for her, it is difficult to see how the firm’s exercise of control
directly benefits the worker. When the firm subjects its worker to this
type of control that directly benefits the firm but not the worker, the law
should weigh such control in favor of finding that the firm is the worker’s

125. See TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 11; Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy,
30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1075 (2015); Lobel, supra note 11, at 106 (“The platform, which
increases connectivity, access to information, and the application of advanced technology to every
aspect of the deal, impacts the relevant transaction costs at all three stages.”).
126. EVANS & GAWER, supra note 2, at 4.
127. Rogers, supra note 22, at 87–89.
128. See TELLES, JR., supra note 3, at 13; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 24, at 17;
Rogers, supra note 22, at 90–91.
129. See Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, in THE NEXT DIGITAL
DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293, 293 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds.,
2010) (“[The role of reputational information explains how well-functioning marketplaces depend
on the vibrant flow of accurate reputational information, and how misdirected regulation of
reputational information could harm marketplace mechanisms.”).
130. Cf. Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959)
(“Clearly the only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used by licensees is to
place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his
licensees.”).
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employer, and the worker its employee, to encourage the firm to refrain
from frivolously or unnecessarily exercising control.131
The platform operator’s imposition and enforcement of quality control
standards on the platform provider is different. In that case, the provider
benefits directly from the positive reputation and good will attached to
the operator’s brand.132 The firm’s quality control standards are critical
to directly growing the platform provider’s market. For example, a home
painter who uses TaskRabbit to be matched with consumers who need
their home painted benefits directly when every home painter (and,
indeed, every provider) who uses TaskRabbit must meet certain quality
control standards.
Some platform operators allow consumers to choose a specific
provider through their platform. TaskRabbit, for example, allows
consumers to choose their specific “Tasker.”133 Other platform operators,
however, do not afford consumers the ability to select a specific platform
provider. Uber, for example, does not allow a consumer using its platform
to request a particular driver.134
Where the consumer using the platform lacks the ability to select her
specific provider, the platform provider’s benefit from the operator’s
imposition of quality control standards is magnified. Such quality control
standards mitigate the free-rider problem. Indeed, in this context, such
quality control standards prevent a sort of tragedy of the commons that
could ultimately threaten the platform’s survival.135 In this version of the
tragedy, consumer trust in the specific platform and the platform
economy generally serves as the relevant shared resource.
Sticking with the example of Uber’s transportation platform, each
Uber driver should strongly desire that all other Uber drivers live up to
stringent quality control standards because, as discussed above,
maintenance of such standards increases the market for the Uber driver’s
business. While hoping that her fellow Uber drivers maintain those
131. See Vane v. Newcombe, 132 U.S. 220, 233–34 (1889) (listing the fact that a worker
was “free to dispose of his own time” as a factor in favor of classifying the worker as an
independent contractor); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(discussing the understandings that an employee is someone who works fairly regular hours and
that a worker’s freedom to schedule her own hours suggests that the worker is not an employee).
132. See Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, 333 P.3d 723, 725 (Cal. 2014) (“By following the
standards used by all stores in the same chain, the self-motivated franchisee profits from the
expertise, goodwill, and reputation of the franchisor.”).
133. How to Hire for Future Date, TASKRABITT (Sept. 15, 2017), https://support.taskrabbit.
com/hc/en-us/articles/210861763-How-to-Hire-for-Future-Date (explaining that a user may
directly hire a Tasker using the online dashboard).
134. Requesting a Specific Driver, UBER (Sept. 15, 2017), https://help.uber.com/h/1aaf0913484f-4695-9042-e61fc7613f24 (“The Uber app cannot match you with a specific driver.”).
135. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)
(discussing the problems of free riding and overuse that arise when a group shares a public
resource).
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standards, however, the individual driver herself may profitably choose
to avoid compliance with those standards. Given that the Uber consumer
cannot select a specific driver, the individual driver need not fear that her
lax personal quality standards will result in a consumer avoiding her
specifically. The Uber platform’s loss resulting from the individual
driver’s choice to forgo high quality standards will be absorbed by the
platform operator and the substandard provider’s fellow Uber drivers as
a whole. Thus, the individual Uber driver’s personal gain from choosing
to forgo stringent quality standards will likely exceed her personal loss,
as the loss associated with her low-quality service will be spread among
the platform and all of its drivers. The cumulative effect, however, of
each Uber driver making the economically rational decision to personally
forsake stringent quality standards is widespread substandard, and
perhaps unsafe, performance and the catastrophic collapse of the
platform. The platform operator’s ability to impose and enforce stringent
quality control standards on all of its platform providers and, thus, to
safeguard the common good of public trust in the platform and the
platform economy, prevents this tragedy of the commons, to the benefit
of each platform provider.
Network effects amplify the negative impact of quality control
shirking and the positive impact of quality control compliance on the
platform ecosystem. Network effects are inherent to the platform
ecosystem: Obtaining a critical mass of users—both providers and
consumers—is the key to a platform’s survival and success.136 A platform
becomes more valuable to its operator, its providers, and its consumers
as more providers and consumers use the system.137 As more providers
join the network, the platform becomes more attractive to consumers,
who have an easier time matching with a provider, and as more
consumers join the network, the platform becomes more attractive to
providers, who have a greater chance of matching with a consumer.138

136. Lobel, supra note 11, at 155 (“Success in the platform economy often comes down to
reaching and retaining more users.”); ECONOMIST, supra note 121 (“The on-demand model
obviously has network effects: the home-help company with the most help on the books has the
best chance of providing a handyman at 10:30 sharp.”).
137. EVANS & GAWER, supra note 2, at 6 (“A fundamental feature of platforms is the
presence of network effects: platforms become more valuable as users use them. As more users
engage the platform, the platform becomes more attractive to potential new users.” (footnote
omitted)); Katz, supra note 125, at 1122 (“Sharing platforms benefit from indirect network
effects—the more providers operate on the platform, the more valuable the service becomes for
users.”).
138. EVANS & GAWER, supra note 2, at 6.
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These network effects account, in large part, for the viral growth that
certain platforms have experienced.139
Quality control standards are intrinsic to the nature of the platform
economy, in that such standards encourage joining and also allow for the
leveraging of network effects.140 Of crucial importance, this leveraging
of network effects is a two-way street. The absence of quality control
standards compliance can lead to mass migration from the platform,
which might then lead to the platform’s death spiral.
2. In Light of the Control Bargain, the Platform Operator’s Imposition
of Quality Control Standards that Directly Benefit the Provider Should
Not Weigh in Favor of Employee Status
A principal challenge for the drafters of protective workplace
regulation is to optimally balance and promote the interests of not only
the worker and the firm, but also of society as a whole.141 Indeed, much
protective workplace regulation that is the product of the control bargain
and that appears on its face to be concerned principally with the rights of
workers is, in fact, more broadly concerned with societal interests.142
Employment discrimination legislation, for example, which situates in
the employee the right to sue and recover relief for certain invidious
workplace discrimination, is concerned not only with preventing and
remedying economic and psychic harms to the individual employee, but
to a great extent with fostering a societal norm of non-discrimination and
encouraging an allocation of human resources that is more beneficial to

139. Id. (“[Network effects go] a long way toward explaining why some platforms have had
viral growth.”).
140. Id. at 19.
141. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., 769 P.2d 399, 409 (Cal. 1989) (noting that
California’s workers’ compensation statute has “a public purpose beyond the private interests of
the workers themselves,” including protecting the public treasury from the risks of workplace
injuries); ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 34 (“The firm, the individual, and the public good are the three forces
that we constantly try to balance.”); VINEL, supra note 108, at 54 (discussing Francis J. Haas’s
argument in the early 1930s during the debate over enactment of the National Labor Relations
Act that “the time had come to part with the idea that the ‘wage contract concerns only an
employer and an employee’” and to acknowledge that “‘[i]t concerns everybody else’”); see also
Richard Epstein, Uber and Lyft in California: How to Use Employment Law to Wreck an Industry,
FORBES (Mar. 16, 2015, 10:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardepstein/2015/03/16/
uber-and-lyft-in-california-how-to-use-employment-law-to-wreck-an-industry/ (expressing
concern that extensive regulation of labor markets may threaten the business model and, thus,
stifle innovation of platform operators in the transportation arena).
142. VINEL, supra note 108, at 54 (discussing “the Progressive and new liberal idea that the
regulation of the employment relationship produced positive freedoms, that is, freedoms that did
not inhere in the citizen but rather in the public interest for a well-ordered society”).
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society.143 As an additional example, Sections 7 and 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act, which guarantee employees the right to collective
bargaining, are concerned not only with the economic betterment of
workers, but more so with the promotion of industrial peace for the
greater well-being of the worker, the firm, and society.144
Thus, as a normative matter, protective workplace regulation
governing the platform economy ought to be concerned not only with
protecting the platform provider, but also with accommodating the
success of the platform operator and promoting the interests of the
platform consumer and of society.145 The law governing enforcement of
workplace noncompete agreements is particularly instructive.146 Under
the law of the vast majority of states, a covenant not to compete will be
held to be enforceable if it is reasonable.147 Courts arrive at their
reasonableness determination by balancing (1) the firm’s interest in
protecting a legitimate business interest, such as its trade secrets and other
confidential information and its client relationships; (2) the worker’s
interest in free movement across the job market; and (3) society’s interest
in promoting innovation and the public’s reasonable access to various

143. Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 975 (1997) (“At least in part because of the Civil Rights Act of
1964—the most important statutory embodiment of the ideal of racial justice—American culture,
American government, and the American people have absorbed the concepts of equality and
integration embodied in the Act as the proper ethical framework for the resolution of issues of
race.” (footnote omitted)).
144. Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785 (1996) (“The object of the
National Labor Relations Act is industrial peace and stability, fostered by collective-bargaining
agreements providing for the orderly resolution of labor disputes between workers and
employe[r]s.”); id. at 790 (“[T]he [National Labor Relations] Act’s goal [is to] achiev[e] industrial
peace by promoting stable collective-bargaining relationships.”); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.
v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) (“One of the primary purposes of the [NLRA] is to promote
the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to
the mediatory influence of negotiation.”).
145. See Lobel, supra note 11, at 118 (noting that the goals of regulation include correcting
market failures, incentivizing competition, and enhancing the public welfare); cf. LOBEL, supra
note 141, at 34 (“In the legal world we talk about two vectors that often need to be reconciled:
fairness, focusing on the individual rights of employees and the individual interests of firms, and
welfare, considering the overall gains and losses from a public perspective.”).
146. See generally LOBEL, supra note 141, at 53–64 (discussing the reasonableness standard
in evaluating noncompete agreements).
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); LOBEL, supra
note 141, at 53. California law is the principal exception, voiding most noncompete agreements.
See CAL. BUS. AND PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017) (“Except as provided in this chapter, every
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind is to that extent void.”); see also LOBEL, supra note 141, at 50, 53, 64–72 (discussing
California law on noncompete agreements).
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services.148 The law also recognizes that the worker benefits when the
firm is willing to expose her to the firm’s confidential information and its
client relationships.149
The law governing the definition of employment in the platform
economy should be the product of a similar balancing exercise. That law
should balance the need to protect vulnerable platform providers with
platform operators’ interest in protecting their relationships with
consumers, and society’s interest in nurturing the innovations of the
platform economy and leveraging its network effects. The law should
also recognize that the platform provider benefits directly from the
platform’s relationship with consumers and the operator’s willingness to
expose the provider to the operator’s consumer relationships.
Critical to this balancing calculus is a full appreciation of the law’s
constitutive function. In the context of protective workplace regulation
specifically, the law relating to the classification of workers as either
employees or independent contractors influences firm choices as to how
to structure workplace relationships.150 Employment law scholar Noah D.
Zatz, speaking on the law’s constitutive role in this context, has
explained, “Law does not just come in after the fact and decide whether
a particular structure is employment subject to labor law. Instead, law
shapes what structures arise in the first place, and it channels work toward
some structures and away from others.”151
With respect to quality control standards, if the law considers the
platform operator’s right to impose quality control standards on the
platform provider as a factor that will weigh in favor of finding that the
provider is an employee of the operator, the operator is more likely to
forgo the right to impose such standards.152 To be sure, the rational
platform operator will not give up its right to impose quality control
standards lightly. Rather, the rational operator will balance the costs of
148. Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993); LOBEL, supra
note 141, at 53–55, 56–61; Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 648–49 (1960).
149. See, e.g., Hopper, 861 P.2d at 546 (“The employee benefits during his tenure with the
employer by his or her greater importance to the organization as a result of the exposure to the
trade secrets, customer contacts or special training.”).
150. PRASSL, supra note 84, at 193; Glynn, supra note 89, at 207–09 (discussing the
“feedback loop” by which “labor and employment law seeks to define the boundaries of the firm
for purposes of allocating legal responsibility, and, in so doing, alters the relative costs of internal
and external production”); Lobel, supra note 19, at 69–70 (“[M]ost benefits are linked to
employment, including health care, retirement, workers’ compensation, and leave. This link is
increasingly outdated and creates the moral hazard of a further push to labor supplied by
independent contractors and workers.”).
151. Zatz, supra note 84, at 288.
152. Huet, supra note 124.
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additional employment regulation against the costs of forgoing the right
to impose quality control standards.153 Still, given the benefits of quality
control standards for the operator, the consumer, and the provider,
workplace protective regulation should not be applied in a way that
provides such a disincentive to the operator to insist on compliance with
a code of conduct. As a normative matter, the control bargain should not
be viewed so expansively as to encompass an arrangement that would be
to the individual and collective detriment of all parties involved.
With respect to existing protective workplace regulation, the question
of the platform provider’s status as employee or independent contractor
should ultimately be a question of legislative intent. Understanding the
nature of the control bargain allows for insight into this legislative intent.
As a theoretical matter, the parties, especially the state, would likely not
intend to enter into a control bargain that would make all parties worse
off: The state should be presumed reluctant to dictate that it will impose
onerous protective workplace regulations upon the platform operator
unless the operator refrains from engaging in behavior that benefits all
the concerned parties. Thus, one should presume that the legislature never
intended for the control bargain to extend to the platform operator’s
imposition of quality control standards.
C. Insights into the Control Bargain Gained from the
Franchise Context
This Article’s argument with respect to the limitations on the control
bargain in the context of quality control standards and the platform
economy presents an extension rather than a radical break from existing
law. In particular, case law from the franchise context supports this
argument. This case law is particularly apt given that the franchise
business model shares significant similarities with the transaction
platform business model.
Pursuant to the franchise model, a franchisee pays a royalty or fee for
the right to sell a product or service that is connected with the franchisor’s
trademark or trade name.154 Typically, the franchisee pays the franchisor
a one-time front-end fee, as well as royalties and advertising fees based
on a percentage of sales.155 Thus, the franchisee is similar to the platform
provider, which pays the platform operator a portion of its fee for the right
153. See Roose, supra note 29 (discussing start-up companies that offer on-demand services
and that have chosen to employ workers who interface with customers in the hope that employees
will provide better and more consistent service than independent contractors).
154. See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for
the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 420–21 (2005) (describing the
franchisor–franchisee relationship).
155. Id. at 476.
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to attract and connect with customers using the platform and the platform
operator’s name. Neither the franchisee nor the platform provider
receives a salary from the franchisor or platform operator, respectively.156
Rather, both the franchisee and the platform provider retain their profits
after paying the franchise or platform fees.157
Moreover, similar to the platform provider, the franchisee also agrees
to abide by the franchisor’s standards and procedures designed to protect
the franchisor’s trademark.158 As in the case of a platform operator and
provider, when the franchisor requires certain uniform standards of all its
franchisees, the franchisee directly benefits from the control. This is so
because consumers come to rely on the uniform standard associated with
the franchisor’s name.159
The franchise case law informs this Article’s argument with respect
to several critical points. First, the control bargain allows for exceptions
to its cardinal principle that a firm’s retention of control over a worker
weighs in favor of finding that the firm employs the worker and should
be subjected to the imposition of workplace protective regulations.
Second, the firm’s retention of the right to enforce quality control
standards can be one of the control bargain’s exceptions. And finally,
exceptions to the control bargain can be discerned from the nature of
relevant workplace structures.
Appreciating the relevant workplace structures in the franchise
context begins with consideration of the Lanham Act.160 The Lanham Act
requires that a trademark licensor exercise control over the use of its
trademark, lest the trademark lose its significance and be deemed
abandoned.161 Thus, quality control standards are inherent to the
franchise form, which is essentially a lease of a trademark.162 Moreover,
156. Id. at 481.
157. See Michael R. Flynn, The Law of Franchisor Vicarious Liability: A Critique, 1993
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 89, 98–99 (1993) (making this point with respect to franchisees).
158. See Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 733 (Cal. 2014); Kerl v. Dennis
Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 331, 337 (Wis. 2004).
159. Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 331, 337 (“For the franchisee, the arrangement mitigates the risks
of starting a new business by enabling it to capitalize on the good will and established market
associated with the franchisor’s trademark or trade name.”); Browning-Ferris Inds. of Cal., Inc.,
362 NLRB No. 186, 2015 WL 5047768 (Aug. 27, 2015) (Miscimarra & Johnson, dissenting)
(“[O]ne important aspect of the franchising relationship is the franchisee’s ability to reap the
benefits of manifesting to the customer the appearance of a seamless enterprise through the use
and maintenance of the franchisor’s trademark.”).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2012).
161. Id. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if . . . any course of conduct of
the owner . . . causes the mark . . . to lose its significance . . . .”).
162. Kevin M. Shelley & Susan H. Morton, “Control” in Franchising and the Common Law,
19 FRANCHISE L.J. 119, 119–21 (2000) (discussing how quality control standards are inherent to
the franchisor-franchisee relationship); see also Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342, 348 (Me. 2010)
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the value of the franchise is inextricably linked to the strength of the
trademark, which is itself dependent upon quality control standards.163
A body of franchise case law holds that franchisor-imposed quality
control standards inherent to the franchise form should not weigh in favor
of finding that the franchisee’s worker is an employee of the franchisor.164
Much of this case law can be read as reasoning that the legislature that
created the franchise structure, which enables a firm to lease its trademark
to a separate firm, must not have intended that quality control standards
inherent to protecting the trademark would make the franchisor the
employer of the franchisee’s employees: The state that authorized the
franchise form would not want to impose regulation inimical to that
form.165
Accordingly, courts in numerous jurisdictions have narrowed the
control test in the franchise context.166 These courts distinguish between
control by the franchisor that relates to the franchisee’s day-to-day
operations and quality control standards imposed by the franchisor that
seek to maintain uniformity of service and product across franchisees
and, thus, to protect the franchisor’s trademark.167 Under this case law,
the former type of control suggests an agency or employment relationship
between the franchisor and the franchisee or its employee, while the latter
type of control does not.168
Thus, numerous courts have held that the control inherent in the
franchise business model necessary to protect the franchisor’s trademark
is not sufficient to establish an agency or employment relationship.169 For
(“[A]t its core, the franchise system involves the licensing of intellectual property, usually in the
form of the franchisor’s trademark.”).
163. King, supra note 154, at 468 (“Franchising depends on the use of shared trademarks,
the value of which is sustained by controlling the uniformity and quality of the products and
services marketed under the trademark.”).
164. Shelley & Morton, supra note 162, at 124–26.
165. See, e.g., Rainey, 998 A.2d at 348 (discussing the Lanham Act’s abandonment
provisions and concluding that “[a]s a result, it is necessary to evaluate the franchise relationship
in light of the franchisor’s duty to police its trademark”); cf. Flynn, supra note 157, at 91 (“This
traditional rule [of agency] . . . does not work well in the franchise paradigm: the very nature of a
franchised good or service implies some, but not total, franchisor control over the means of
performance.”); William L. Killion, Franchisor Vicarious Liability—The Proverbial Assault on
the Citadel, 24 FRANCHISE L.J. 162, 164 (2005) (“The problem with applying the Restatement test
to franchising is that franchising is all about controls.”).
166. King, supra note 154, at 431.
167. Shelley & Morton, supra note 162, at 124–26 (discussing in some detail several such
cases).
168. King, supra note 154, at 431–32, 435–36; Shelley & Morton, supra note 162, at 124–
26.
169. See, e.g., Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 733–39 (Cal. 2014); Billops
v. Magness Constr. Co., 391 A.2d 196, 197–98 (Del. 1978) (“If, in practical effect, the franchise
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example, in 2014, the California Supreme Court held in Patterson v.
Domino’s Pizza, LLC170 that
the mere fact that the franchisor has reserved the right to
require or suggest uniform workplace standards intended to
protect its brand, and the quality of customer service, at its
franchised locations is not, standing alone, sufficient to
impose “employer” or “principal” liability on the franchisor
for statutory or common law violations by one of the
franchisee’s employees toward another.171
Rather, for the franchisor to be an “employer,” the franchisor must retain
“a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direction,
supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the
agreement goes beyond the stage of setting standards, and allocates to the franchisor the right to
exercise control over the daily operations of the franchise, an agency relationship exists.”);
Hoffnagle v. McDonald’s Corp., 522 N.W.2d 808, 814 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a franchisor was
not liable for the injuries suffered by its franchisee’s employee where the franchisor did not
control the day-to-day operations of the franchisee); Rainey, 998 A.2d at 349 (“The traditional
test allows a franchisor to regulate the uniformity and the standardization of products and services
without risking the imposition of vicarious liability.”); see also Ketterling v. Burger King Corp.,
272 P.3d 527, 533 (Idaho 2012) (“General franchise operating requirements are usually not
enough to establish control or a right of control giving rise to [vicarious] liability.”); Papa John’s
Int’l, Inc. v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44, 54, 56 (Ky. 2008) (“Because a franchisor typically
concentrates its control on the quality and operational requirements relating to its trade or service
mark, as opposed to the day-to-day operations and management of the business, ‘[t]he perceived
fairness of requiring a principal who closely controls the physical conduct of an agent to answer
for the harm caused by the agent is diminished in this context.’ . . . A franchisor is vicariously
liable for the tortious conduct of the franchisee when it, in fact, has control or right of control over
the daily operation of the specific aspect of the franchisee’s business that is alleged to have caused
the harm.” (alteration in original) (quoting Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 338
(Wis. 2004)); Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc., 990 N.E.2d 1054, 1064 (Mass. 2013)
(“Today we join these courts in concluding that a franchisor is vicariously liable for the conduct
of its franchisee only where the franchisor controls or has a right to control the specific policy or
practice resulting in harm to the plaintiff.”); Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 331, 338–41 (“If the operational
standards included in the typical franchise agreement for the protection of the franchisor’s
trademark were broadly construed as capable of meeting the ‘control or right to control’ test that
is generally used to determine respondeat superior liability, then franchisors would almost always
be exposed to vicarious liability for the torts of their franchisees.”); cf. Love’s Barbeque Rest.,
245 N.L.R.B. 78, 118 (1978) (“Yet, the Board has consistently pointed out that the need for
uniformity of operation [for the mutual benefit of the franchisor and franchisees] will not, of itself,
suffice to establish a joint employer relationship.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Kallman
v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981); id. at 120 (reasoning that standards aimed at protecting
the quality of the franchise brand or product do not suggest a joint-employer relationship).
170. 333 P.3d 723 (Cal. 2014).
171. Id. at 739 n.21; see also id. at 726 (“The imposition and enforcement of a uniform
marketing and operational plan cannot automatically saddle the franchisor with responsibility for
employees of the franchisee who injure each other on the job.”).
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workplace behavior of the franchisee’s employees.”172 “Any other
guiding principal,” the court reasoned, “would disrupt the franchise
relationship.”173
The court in Patterson recognized that a certain level of franchisor
control over the franchisee and the franchisee’s employees is inherent in
the nature of the franchising business model, given that the franchisor
imposes standards on the franchisee designed to protect the franchisor’s
trademarked brand.174 Indeed, in the case at hand, the court accepted that
the franchisor had prescribed and “vigorously enforced” “standards and
procedures involving pizza-making and delivery, general store
operations, and brand image.”175
In its analysis, the court highlighted the purpose that such franchisorimposed standards serve: The standards seek to ensure that a customer of
any franchisee of the franchisor receives a similar experience each time
she patronizes a franchisee.176 In other words, “[t]he systemwide
standards and controls provide a means of protecting the trademarked
brand at great distances.”177
The Patterson court also focused on the benefit to the franchisee under
this type of franchisor control: The franchisee benefits from the goodwill
attached to the franchisor’s brand, goodwill that, in large part, comes
from the standards that the franchisor imposes on its franchisees.178 “The
goal—which benefits both parties to the contract—is to build and keep
172. Id. at 726; see also id. at 739; Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 341 (“[A] franchisor may be held
vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of its franchisee only if the franchisor has control or a
right of control over the daily operation of the specific aspect of the franchisee’s business that is
alleged to have caused the harm.”).
173. Patterson, 333 P.3d at 739.
174. Id. at 725–26 (“A franchisor, which can have thousands of stores located far apart,
imposes comprehensive and meticulous standards for marketing its trademarked brand and
operating its franchises in a uniform way.”); see also Depianti v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc.,
990 N.E.2d 1054, 1063 (Mass. 2013) (“Broadly extending the ‘right to control test’ for vicarious
liability to the franchisor-franchisee relationship, where franchisors are obligated to maintain
certain controls, could have the undesirable effect of penalizing franchisors for complying with
Federal [trademark] law.”); Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 338 (“[B]ecause many franchise relationships
include a license to use the franchisor’s trade or service mark, the detailed quality and operational
standards and inspection rights specified in the franchise agreement are integral to the protection
of the franchisor’s trade or service mark under the Lanham Act.”); David Laufer & David
Gurnick, Minimizing Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for Acts of Their Franchisees, 6
FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 3–4 (1987) (discussing how franchisor control over the franchisee is inherent
in the franchisor-franchisee relationship and concluding that “[r]eservations of controls as a means
to protect reputation and meaning of trademarks are thus important tools to franchisors”).
175. Patterson, 333 P.3d at 726; see also id. at 733–34.
176. Id. at 727.
177. Id. at 733.
178. Id. at 725 (“By following the standards used by all stores in the same chain, the selfmotivated franchisee profits from the expertise, goodwill, and reputation of the franchisor.”).
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customer trust by ensuring consistency and uniformity in the quality of
goods and services, the dress of franchise employees, and the design of
the stores themselves.”179
Finally, the court concluded that the control inherent in the very nature
of a franchise agreement could not alone support a finding that the
franchisor was the employer of the franchisee’s employee, especially
given that the franchisee benefits from that control:
The ‘means and manner’ test generally used by the Courts of
Appeal cannot stand for the proposition that a
comprehensive operating system alone constitutes the
‘control’ needed to support vicarious liability clams like
those raised here. As noted, a franchise contract consists of
standards, procedures, and requirements that regulate each
store for the benefit of both parties. This approach minimizes
chain-wide variations that can affect product quality,
customer service, trade name, business methods, public
reputation, and commercial image.180
The franchise form enables the franchisor to license its trademark to a
franchisee, which remains a distinct entity despite its use of the
trademark. One should presume that the legislature that created the
franchise form must not have intended for the franchisor’s efforts to
protect its licensed trademark to give rise to employment obligations
running against the franchisor and in favor of the franchisee or its
employees.181 Employer liability should not attach to the franchisor
merely because of actions that the franchisor takes that are inherent to the
franchise form—namely steps to safeguard the trademark and reputation
of the franchise.182
Thus, the franchise cases teach that the control bargain allows for
categorical exceptions whereby a firm’s exercise of a certain type and
amount of control over its worker will not weigh in favor of finding
employee/employer status. Indeed, the cases make plain that the firm’s
retention of the right to enforce quality control standards with respect to
a worker can be the type of control that is the subject of such a categorical
exception. The cases also teach that legislative intent with respect to such
exceptions can be deduced from the structure of the work relationship at
issue in conjunction with the nature of the control being exercised.
179. Id. at 733.
180. Id. at 738.
181. See King, supra note 154, at 469 (“It quickly becomes manifest that traditional rules for
vicarious liability . . . are ill-suited for the franchisor-franchisee relationship.”).
182. See Cislaw v. Southland Corp., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 386, 391 (1992) (“The cases, taken as a
whole, impliedly recognize that the franchisor’s interest in the reputation of its entire system
allows it to exercise certain controls over the enterprise without running the risk of transforming
its independent contractor franchisee into an agent.”).
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This franchise case law supports this Article’s argument that a
platform operator’s retention of the right to impose quality control
standards on a platform provider should not weigh in favor of a finding
that the operator employs the provider. Quality control standards are
inherent to the nature of the platform economy. Moreover, such standards
directly benefit not only the platform operator, but also the platform
consumer and the platform provider. Thus, one may reasonably conclude
that the legislature would not want to enter into a control bargain that
incentivizes platform operators to refrain from imposing such beneficial
quality control standards.
CONCLUSION
The advent of the platform economy has generated innovative
workplace structures whereby consumers engage service providers
through various transaction platforms. The proliferation of these new
workplace arrangements raises the issue of whether a provider who is
engaged through a transaction platform should be classified as an
employee of the platform operator within the purview of workplace
protective legislation or, rather, as an independent contractor outside the
scope of such legislation’s protections. This Article has focused more
specifically on whether the platform operator’s reservation of the right to
impose quality control standards on the provider who is engaged through
its platform ought to give rise to employment obligations running in favor
of the provider and against the operator.
Ultimately, a court’s determination of whether workplace protective
legislation encompasses the relationship between platform operator and
platform provider should be decided by reference to legislative intent. For
most workplace protective legislation, however, neither the text nor
legislative history is even minimally instructive as to such intent. Thus,
this Article looks more broadly for insight into legislative intent,
examining the structure of workplace protective legislation generally,
considering the nature of the platform economy, and reasoning from case
law addressing the meaning of “employment” in the similar context of
the franchisor-franchisee relationship.
This structural-purposive inquiry into the definition of “employment”
as applied to the platform economy suggests that a platform operator’s
imposition of quality control standards on the provider that uses its
platform should not weigh in favor of finding that the operator is the
provider’s employer. One can discern from the structure of workplace
protective legislation generally a “control bargain” pursuant to which the
state imposes a scheme of workplace protective regulation on the firm
only if the firm retains a certain type and degree of control over its
worker. The nature of the platform economy suggests that the platform
operator’s retention of the right to impose quality control standards on
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providers engaged through its platform should be seen as outside the
scope of this control bargain.
A platform operator’s enforcement of quality control standards is
inherent to the structure of the platform economy in that the maintenance
of such standards promotes trust between consumer and provider and,
thus, enables leveraging of network effects. Enforcement of such
standards also mitigates the platform provider free-rider problem
whereby a provider benefits from the platform’s positive reputation while
simultaneously flouting the code of conduct essential to the maintenance
of that reputation. Indeed, with respect to platforms that do not allow the
consumer to select a specific provider, the operator’s enforcement of
quality control standards is necessary to prevent a tragedy of the
commons of sorts in which each rational provider maximizes her
individual welfare by avoiding the costs of providing a high-quality
product or service to the collective detriment of all other providers and
the imperilment of the platform.
Thus, quality control standards directly benefit platform providers by
protecting and growing the providers’ market. A legislature
presumptively would not enter into a control bargain that incentivizes the
platform operator to eschew control that would benefit all concerned—
the provider as well as the public and the operator. Therefore, a legislature
presumptively would not wish for the platform operator’s retention of the
right to impose quality control standards on the operator who is engaged
through its platform to weigh in favor of finding an employer/employee
relationship between operator and provider.
Case law interpreting the term “employee” in the similar context of a
franchisor-franchisee relationship informs this structural-purposive
analysis. In sum, this case law holds that the franchisor’s retention of the
right to impose quality control standards on the franchisee is not the type
of control necessary to support a finding that the franchisee’s employee
is an employee of the franchisor. This case law teaches that the control
bargain allows for exceptions to the rule that the firm’s retention of
control over a worker weighs in favor of finding that the firm employs
the worker, that the firm’s reservation of the right to impose quality
control standards can be such an exception, and that such an exception
can be discerned from the nature of the relevant workplace structures.
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